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Differences in financial systems are often named as a prime candidate for the current state of global imbalances. This paper
argues that the process of capital liberalization can explain a substantial fraction of the US net external liabilities. We present
a simple two-country model with an internationally traded bond, in which capital controls are reflected in the presence of
borrowing and lending constraints on that bond. In a US versus the rest of the world (RoW) scenario, we perform experiments
that are largely consistent with countries’ liberalization experiences. A reduction in the RoW’s controls on capital outflows
and/or a tightening in the RoW’s borrowing constraint enables the US economy to better insure against consumption risk
relative to the rest of the world, and therefore decreases its motives for precautionary asset holdings relative to the rest of the
world. As a result of these asymmetric shifts in countries’ barriers to capital mobility, the US runs a long run external deficit.
JEL Classification: F32, F34, F41.
Keywords: Capital Liberalization, External Imbalances, Net Foreign Asset Position, Precautionary Savings, Borrowing and
Lending Constraints.
A pénzügyi közvetítõ rendszerek különbözõsége sokak szerint a jelenlegi globális egyensúlytalanságok kialakulásának egyik fõ
oka. A tanulmány bemutatja, hogy a tõkepiaci liberalizáció folyamata miként magyarázhatja az USA külsõ adósságállománya
alakulásának jelentõs részét. Egy egyszerû, két országos modellt vizsgálunk, amelyben az egyetlen nemzetközileg forgalmazott
pénzügyi eszköz egy kockázatmentes kötvény. Ennek kereskedelme azonban szabályozott, amelyet a hitelezés és a hitelfelvé-
tel elé állított korlátokkal ragadunk meg. Az USA és a világ többi része (VTR) közötti kapcsolatot vizsgáló szimulációnk ered-
ménye konzisztens a különbözõ országok tõkepiaci liberalizáció során szerzett tapasztalataival. Ha a VTR-ben csökkennek a
külföldi hitelezés és hitelfelvétel elé állított korlátok, ez lehetõvé teszi az USA számára, hogy a VTR-hez képest hatékonyab-
ban biztosítsa magát a fogyasztási kockázatokkal szemben. Ez csökkenti az USA óvatossági megtakarítási hajlandóságát. A tõ-
kemozgások elé állított korlátok aszimmetrikus csökkenésének hatása tehát az USA hosszú távú külsõ deficitje.
Abstract
Összefoglalás1 Introduction
In recent years the US net external liabilities stand at close to 20% of its GDP, the current account has
been in deﬁcit for most of the last 25 years. The fact that the US is an external borrower, and the size
and persistence of its net external position is challenging to the conventional wisdom of standard economic
theory and has led to a large debate, among academics and policy makers alike. Contents of this debate are
the sustainability of these imbalances, whether and when adjustment needs to take place or how painful it is
going to be for the world economy. A number of authors have argued that major policy actions need to be
taken to avoid a painful worldwide rebalancing process (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), Roubini and Setser
(2005), Blanchard et al. (2005)). On the other hand, a number of papers have emphasized that before policy
advice can be given as to how adjustment of the current global imbalance should take place, it is important
to understand how these imbalances have arrived in the ﬁrst place.
WesuggestthatpartoftheUSimbalancecanberationalizedbydifferencesinthedegreeofﬁnancialopenness
across countries, and, in particular, the effects of asymmetric changes in barriers to capital mobility that are
a result of the process of capital liberalization. Arguably, the US is the economy that has had the most
liberalized ﬁnancial account already in the 1980s while in most other regions of the world capital controls
were much more prevalent. In the rest of the world the process of capital liberalization has, over the last
decades, led on the one hand to a reduction of controls on capital outﬂows, as a result of the catching up of
other advanced and emerging market economies in terms of capital account openness. On the other hand,
many emerging market economies that have experienced crises after the initial liberalization of their capital
accounts, have faced increased limitations in their ability to borrow internationally. We argue that, over these
two channels, capital liberalization has led to asymmetric changes in countries’ ability to borrow and lend
internationally, which has brought about differences in their ability to manage consumption uncertainty. In
particular, it has improved, relative to the rest of the world (RoW), the US’s ability to better smooth their
consumption and therefore has lowered their motives for precautionary asset holdings relative to RoW. As a
result, the US runs an external deﬁcit.
We address this question in a stylized two-country one good model of consumption and saving choice. We
consider an endowment economy, where outputs arrive stochastically each period. The home economy
is taken to be the US while the foreign economy stands for the rest of the world. We assume that the
representative agent in each country can trade a non-contingent bond to smooth consumption in response to
country speciﬁc shocks, but that she cannot do so unrestrictedly. In particular, in each country agents have
limited access to borrow and lend in international ﬁnancial markets; there are limits beyond which capital
cannot ﬂow in or out. We think of the presence of capital controls as being reﬂected in the tightness of these
borrowing and lending constraints. When the limits are set to zero, such that the bond holdings are not only
constrained but cannot be used at all, the economies are in ﬁnancial autarky. As the constraints get more and
more relaxed, it becomes increasingly easier to smooth consumption.
The setup of the model provides us with a structured way to analyze the effect of changes in the degree
of ﬁnancial openness, resulting from the process of capital liberalization. In particular, we use the model
to perform two experiments: The catching up of the rest of the world’s ﬁnancial openness is modeled as a
one-time permanent relaxation of the upper limit of capital outﬂows of the foreign economy. On the other
hand, the limitations that some emerging market countries faced in their ability to borrow internationally
in response to crisis experiences is modeled as tightening in the RoW’s borrowing constraint. Effectively,
both these channels improve the US ability to borrow relative to the rest of the world. For any given level
of risk it faces it can now better use the international bond for consumption smoothing purposes, and the
implied drop in consumption volatility means that it has less of a motive to hold assets as a buffer for times
of low consumption. It is this drop in the (relative) importance of the precautionary savings motive that
endogenously makes the US hold long run negative net foreign assets as it transitions to a new implied steady
state.
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We conduct extensive sensitivity analysis for crucial parameters, in particular, for the initial level of ﬁnancial
openness and the extent of liberalization assumed, as well as for the functional form of preferences. We also
consider a model with production and capital accumulation, thereby allowing for an additional (internal)
asset that the change in precautionary asset demand can fall on. The model allowing for capital accumula-
tion is similar to the model of Backus et al. (1992), which is a standard workhorse model of international
macroeconomics. In all speciﬁcations, we show, that our model framework implies that differences in ﬁnan-
cial openness and the process of capital liberalization can contribute to rationalizing the sizeable observed
imbalances and help explain the puzzle of the direction of net ﬂows, within a standard neoclassical model.
There are several contributions in the recent literature that our paper connects to, that emphasize the role of
cross-countrydifferencesinﬁnancialfactorsasapotentialdrivingforcebehindtheimbalances(Mendoza et al.
(2007), Caballero et al. (2006), Caballero (2006)). Mendoza et al. (2007) emphasize the heterogeneity of ﬁnan-
cial systems within countries, such as a country’s credit markets and differences in the ability to borrow from
collateral. In their model agents face idiosyncratic risk from both endowments and investment technology,
which has to be managed differently. In this relatively rich model setup, differences in ﬁnancial develop-
ment between countries matter when economies open up to trade in international ﬁnancial markets. The
accompanied process of factor equalization -less developed economies face an increase in the interest rate
relative to its autarky interest rate, therefore an incentive to save- leads to capital ﬂows from less developed
ﬁnancial markets into the US economy. Contrary to Mendoza et al. (2007) we do not focus on differences in
how well ﬁnancial markets are developed within a country. We show, in a comparably much simpler model
setup, that a sizeable part of imbalances can come from differences solely in how easily countries can access
international ﬁnancial markets, irrespective of a comparison of the state of ﬁnancial development within a
country. The process of capital liberalization has changed the ease with which countries can demand assets
in the international ﬁnancial market, and as a result changed their motives for precautionary asset holdings.
Caballero et al. (2006) argue that for emerging market economies, the development of local ﬁnancial markets
has not kept pace with the growth experiences of their economies which results in an inability to supply
high quality ﬁnancial assets. In our model imbalances derive not from differences in the ability to supply
assets, but rather from differences in the demand for assets that have been induced by the process of capital
liberalization.
In another recent paper, Fogli and Perri (2006) argue that the ’great moderation’ in business cycle volatility in
the US (compared to the rest of the world) has led to a decrease in consumption volatility, and as a result to a
decrease in the US precautionary savings motive relative to the rest of the world. Similarly to Fogli and Perri
(2006), in rationalizing the US external deﬁcit, our paper emphasizes the importance of lower precautionary
savings motives relative to RoW as a result of its lower relative consumption volatility. However, in our
model it is the opening up of countries’ capital accounts which allows the US to better smooth its consump-
tion and endogenously achieve a lower consumption volatility.
Durdu et al.(2007)useasmallopeneconomymodeltosuggestthatthemotiveforemergingmarketeconomies’
precautionary asset holdings may stem from either changes in business cycle volatility, from ﬁnancial glob-
alization, or from self-insurance against sudden stops. In the line of thought of a self-insurance motive, we
obtain similar effects from our experiment of modeling the increased difﬁculty to borrow internationally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section2 discusses how ﬁnancial openness and capital liberaliza-
tion is measured in the data. In section 3 we present the model framework, a simple two country endowment
model that allows for constraints on capital in- and outﬂows. Section 3 explains in detail how ﬁnancial open-
ness and capital liberalization is modeled. Subsections 3 and 3 brieﬂy describe the solution technique and
discusses parametrization. In section 4 we present the results of our ’capital liberalization’ exercise for the
simple model. together with extensive sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
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THE US EXTERNAL POSITION
Figure 1 plots the development of the US current account and its net foreign asset (NFA) position. As can
be seen the gradual decline in the US net external position begins in the mid 1980s, and was actually positive
before. As we will show in the next section, the beginning of this downward trend in the US NFA position
coincides with major liberalization periods in terms capital account openness in the rest of the world.
Figure 1
US current account and net foreign assets as percentage of GDP







































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
MEASUREMENT OF FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND CAPITAL LIBERALIZATION
A large literature has studied the effect of ﬁnancial integration on growth and volatility, with mixed con-
clusions. While the focus of this paper is a different one - in particular, we focus on the effect of capital
liberalization on countries’ net foreign asset positions -, we draw from this literature in terms of how it treats
the measurement of ﬁnancial openness. In general, one can distinguish two types of measures of ﬁnancial
openness, de jure and de facto measures.
The majority of the papers studying the effects of capital account liberalization rely on ’de jure’ measures,
whichreﬂectlegalrestrictionsoncapitalmovements(orlackthereof). Thesearerule-basedindicesonvarious
types of capital controls, in the largest number of cases based on the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Rate
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).1 A shortcoming of de jure measures is the fact that they
just capture whether there are controls or not, but not how stringent these controls are. In addition to
the problem of measuring the intensity of legal capital controls, there is generally also a lack of systematic
information on how strongly these legal restrictions are enforced.
Defactomeasuresofﬁnancialintegrationtypicallylookatactualdataoncross-countrycapitalﬂows(orinter-
est rate differentials) to draw conclusions about the degree of capital mobility. Observed ﬂows do, however,
not necessarily capture the correct degree of capital mobility. In practise it is difﬁcult to distinguish whether
capital does not ﬂow across countries because of actual restrictions or because of other factors unrelated to
the level of capital restrictions.
1 Among others, de-jure measures based on information on the AREAER have been developed by Quinn (1997), Johnston and Tamirisa (1998), Miniane
(2004), Glick and Hutchison (2005) and Chinn and Ito (2005). There are also a number of surveys of the literature, see e.g Dooley (1996), Eichengreen
(2001) and Edison et al. (2002).
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Figure 2 documents the evolution of three types of de jure indices for the United States, for the group of in-
dustrial countries other than the US, and for emerging economies, over the period of 1983-2004.2,3 The black
linewithdiamond-signsdisplaystheevolutionofacountry-averageoverabinaryindicatoron’restrictionson
payments for capital account transactions’ published in the pre-1996 editions of the IMF’s AREAER, which
takes on value 1 if there are restrictions or value 0 if there are no restrictions. As noted byEichengreen (2001)
this simple dummy accounts only for controls on capital outﬂows. Because of the obvious limitations of a
dichotomic dummy the IMF changed reporting procedures starting with the 1996 edition of the AREAER.
In the category of restrictions on payments for capital account transactions, the "new" AREAER provides
dummies in not one but 13 subcategories of transactions, some of which are even further disaggregated.
Miniane (2004) uses the post-1996 disaggregated capital account information and extends the indices back to
1983 for a representative sample of countries. This index is given by the purple line with circle-signs in ﬁgure
2. While the disaggregated indices generally do a better job than the pre-1996 single dummy in reﬂecting
global trends toward capital account liberalization, the index unfortunately does not distinguish between
controls on capital inﬂows and outﬂows.4 Finally, ﬁgure 2 plots the inverse of an index of ﬁnancial openness
developed by Chinn and Ito (2005), which is given by the blue line with crosses.5 Chinn and Ito’s index is
a broader measure in the sense that it incorporates information not only on countries’ restrictions on cap-
ital account transactions, but also on restrictions on current account transactions, the presence of multiple
exchange rates within that country or requirements for the surrender of export proceeds.
As can be seen from these indices, the US has always been ﬁnancially open over the last three decades, and
most other regions have been liberalizing gradually since the beginning of the 1980s. The IMF dummy indi-
cates that the US were not imposing any restrictions on it capital outﬂows over the entire period. The Chinn
and Ito index also appraises the US the highest ﬁnancial openness over the entire period. Only Miniane’s
index indicates that the US has also been liberalizing its ﬁnancial account, however, starting from a low level
of restrictions already in the mid 1980s.
The indices for the group of industrial countries other that the US also paint a clear picture. Initially, in the
mid 1980s, because of controls on capital inﬂows and especially on outﬂows in many industrial countries
world capital markets were far from complete. While for many countries capital was not being prevented
from ﬂowing into the country, controls on capital outﬂows often were much tighter. The evolution of
the IMF dummy indicates that starting in the mid 1980s controls on capital outﬂows have been largely
eliminated. Also the other indices suggest that industrial countries have largely caught up with the US in
terms of capital account openness.
For the group of emerging countries the picture is somewhat less clear. One thing to point out is the general
higher level of restrictions on capital ﬂows to begin with, when compared to industrial countries. On the
other hand liberalization seems to have occurred at also at a lower pace. For the IMF index we observe,
after an initial spike, a steady reduction of restrictions on capital outﬂows. The Miniane index displays a
lesser degree of liberalization. This may be partly due to the fact that after recurrent crisis that some of the
emerging market economies have faced during the end of the 1990s, they suffered limitations in their ability
to borrow internationally.
It is important to note that the measurement of the existence and intensity of capital controls is empirically
very challenging, and as a result the effect of restrictions to capital mobility on economic variables is some-
2 The group of industrial countries except US consists of Canada, Japan, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the UK. The group of emerging countries consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Singapore,
Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela.
3 We focus on de jure indices since these most closely reﬂect the prevailing level and evolution of restrictions on capital ﬂows, that we will be interested
in for our theoretical model.
4 While the "new" AREAER editions after 1996 now makes a distinction between capital inﬂows and capital outﬂows, this information is not available for
earlier periods.
5 As the original index is an index of openness we plot the inverse of it (and rescale the index to the 0 to 1 interval) to make it comparable with the other
measures of capital restrictions.
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Figure 2
Indices of Capital Restrictions
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Sources: AREAER (IMF, various editions), Miniane (2004), Chinn and Ito (2005)
times difﬁcult to establish. We believe that even more so we need a theory for how ﬁnancial ﬂows relate to
the presence of capital controls in a framework of the models we use in modern macroeconomics.
We make use of the stylized facts just presented in that they inspire the experiments we perform in our
theoretical model: on the one hand we will analyze the effects of a reduction on capital outﬂows in the
RoW, which can be thought of stemming mostly from the group of other industrial countries. On the other
hand, we will consider an experiment of increased difﬁculties in borrowing for the RoW, incorporating the
experiences of some emerging economies.
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MODEL SETUP
The world economy consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, which are taken to be the US and the
rest of the world respectively. We will assume that all idiosyncratic risk is perfectly insured among residents
of a country, i.e. within-country ﬁnancial markets are complete. We can therefore think of a representative















, where  is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. The foreign representative
agent faces an equivalent problem, where foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. Agents of each
country receive an exogenous endowment yt or y
t respectively in every period t. Exogenous outputs are





















where y is mean income, A is a 2x2 matrix of coefﬁcients describing the autocorrelation properties of the





is a vector of shocks from a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and
variance-covariance matrix V(e), i.e. et  N (0,V (e)).
Asset markets are incomplete in the sense that countries are only allowed to trade in a one-period risk-free
bond, bt, which promises one unit of consumption the next period and trades at price 1
rt
, where rt is the
gross real interest rate. We can then write the home country’s budget constraint as:
bt+1
rt
= bt +yt  ct,b0given. (3)
Even though agents are assumed to be able to trade a risk-free bond in order to smooth their consumption,
they cannot do so unrestrictedly. In particular, we assume that the home country’s debt level cannot exceed








6 In principle, there is also a ’natural debt’ limit as in Aiyagari (1994) according to which both countries will not borrow more than the minimum value that
the endowment can take at period t+1 discounted to period t prices. To compute the natural debt limit in a two country model, where the interest rate
is endogenous, is more difﬁcult than in a partial equilibrium model where the interest rate is exogenous. In addition if one the constraint binds for one
of the economies the interest rate generally differs for each agent (for a detailed discussion see Anagnostopoulos (2006)). However, the debt limits we
impose here are generally stricter than the natural debt limit.
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The foreign country’s budget constraint and the borrowing and lending constraints are equivalent versions
of equations (3), (4) and (5), replacing all variables with starred ones. The borrowing limit for the foreign
country is therefore given by
b
t+1







on borrowing and lending effectively matter. More precisely, the limit that is imposed on up to how much
one country can borrow is determined by either its own borrowing constraint or by the other country’s
lending constraint - whichever of the two is stricter. Formally, the range over which the international bond











denotes the foreign country’s effec-
tive borrowing constraint.
The equilibrium of this economy is deﬁned as a path of interest rates frtg1















1. ct and bt+1 maximize (1) subject to (3)-(4)-(5), for all t, and b0 given,
2. c
t and b
t+1 maximize the foreign version of (1) s.t. the foreign versions of (3)-(4)-(5), for all t, and b
0
given,
3. the real interest rate clears the bond market, bt + b
t = 0, for all t,
4. the goods market also clears (due to Walras’ Law), ct +c
t = yt +y
t , for all t.






















































7 In equilibrium, since bonds are held in zero net supply, b
t =  bt, the foreign country’s borrowing constraint reads
bt+1






8 Where we have used the bond market clearing condition to substitute out b
t .



















We can distinguish ﬁve cases that are summarized by equilibrium conditions (6)-(13):
1. The case where no borrowing or lending constraint is binding for either country. In this case the








t = 0, and the Euler equations (6)-(7) reduce to their standard expressions.
2. The borrowing constraint binds for the home country, i.e.
bt+1
y =  B. The Lagrange multiplier of the
home borrowing constraint, 
B
t , which reﬂects the shadow value of relaxing the constraint marginally,
is therefore positive.
3. The lending constraint binds for the home country, that is
bt+1
y = B, and 
B
t > 0.






5. The lending constraint binds for the foreign economy,
bt+1
y =  ¯ B,and B

t > 0.
THE INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND CAPITAL LIBERALIZATION IN
THE MODEL
In the framework of the model we think of ﬁnancial market openness as being reﬂected in the tightness
of the respective borrowing and lending constraints the countries are facing. Therefore, a relaxation of a
country’s lending or borrowing constraints can be interpreted as a reduction of capital controls on that
country’s capital outﬂows or inﬂows. Before we discuss the choice of these constraints in our model, let us
ﬁrst consider two special cases that are nested in our model setup and correspond to the more standard cases
analyzed previously in the literature, known as the ’ﬁnancial autarky’ case and as the incomplete markets
’bond economy’ case.
First, if B = B

= B = B = 0 then the world is in ﬁnancial autarky. In this case there is no international
consumption risk sharing - the bond cannot be used at all to insure against idiosyncratic (country) risk.9
Second, B, B

, B and B are sufﬁciently high, such that effectively none of the constraints ever binds, and
the bond can be very freely traded across countries.10 This case coincides with the standard case of what is
known as the incomplete markets ‘bond economy’ case. It is well known that under this case, even though
markets are incomplete, the outcome is very close to the perfect risk sharing case under complete markets,
where consumption in both economies perfectly co-moves (see, e.g., Baxter and Crucini (1995)).
We interpret intermediate cases between ﬁnancial autarky and no limits in borrowing and lending as reﬂect-
ing intermediate stages of capital account openness, with the state of liberalization being more advanced as
9 In the endowment case therefore volatility of the exogenous endowment process directly translates into the volatility of consumption. In a later extension
of the model that includes capital accumulation, the home country can even under ﬁnancial autarky engage in at least some consumption smoothing
through increasing or running down its capital stock.
10 However, there still is a ’natural debt limit’ and a ’No Ponzi’ condition that needs to be satisﬁed.
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B and B

, and B and B increase. The presence of limits in bond holdings in these intermediate cases makes
it hard for the countries’ economic agents to perfectly insure against country speciﬁc shocks. Since agents
dislike the possibility of being left without any consumption at any point in time, they have an incentive
to build up a buffer stock of savings to facilitate consumption smoothing, that is they have precautionary
savings motives. This will be the crucial mechanism with which the model is able to generate external im-
balances. As long as borrowing constraints are not ’too’ relaxed, such that consumption smoothing is not
too close to perfect risk sharing, precautionary savings motives have a signiﬁcant impact on the equilibrium
bond holding policy functions.11
The experiments we undertake are the following. The initial borrowing constraints, denoted BBL and BBL





, are initially set to some constant fraction of bond holding to the countries’ steady state output, i.e.
B = b
y and B = b




y. From the evidence
given in section 2 it is safe to assume that the US’ constraints have always been looser than the RoW’s
constraints. Effectively, this means that the RoW’s constraints determine how easily both countries can
access international ﬁnancial markets and make use of the bond for their consumption smoothing purposes.
In particular, we can use the model to perform two experiments. In the ﬁrst experiment, the catching up of
the rest of the world’s ﬁnancial openness in the RoW is modeled as a one-time permanent relaxation of the
upper limit of capital outﬂows of the foreign economy. This reﬂects the dismantling of restrictions on con-
trols on capital outﬂows especially in industrial countries, but to some degree also in emerging economies.
We model the RoW’s reduction of controls on capital outﬂows as a relaxation of the lending constraint to a
new level B
AL




. This is depicted in the left column of
ﬁgure 3. The upper left panel describes the initial level of openness to international ﬁnancial markets, before
liberalization. It can be seen that the US constraints (’Home constraints’) are looser than the RoW’s con-
straints (’Foreign constraints’), and as a result the permissible region over which the internationally traded
bond can be used is pinned down by the latter, given by what we call ’effective constraints’. Liberalization
relaxes the RoW’s constraint on capital outﬂows and, as a result, also implies an outward shift of the effective






. After liberalization, the permissable region over which the bond can be
held has become larger, international ﬁnancial markets have become more accessible. As a result both coun-
tries are now able to better use the internationally traded bond for their consumption smoothing purposes
and achieve, for any given output volatility, a lower consumption volatility. This reduces the incentives for
precautionary savings in both countries. However, because the reduction in the RoW’s controls on capital
outﬂows has led to a relaxation of the effective US borrowing constraint, and countries care more about
smoothing out the downside risk of consumption uncertainty, the US’ precautionary savings motives will
fall by more than the precautionary savings motives in the RoW.
In a second experiment, we can capture the limitations that some emerging market countries faced in their
ability to borrow internationally in response to crisis experiences by modeling it as a tightening in the RoW’s
borrowing constraint. This may reﬂect the responses of some emerging market economies to ﬁnancial turbu-
lence and their associated difﬁculties to borrow in international markets. This shift is displayed graphically
in the right column of ﬁgure 3. Such a shift would decrease the permissible region over which the bond can
be held in response to shocks to income. While this implies that the precautionary savings motives of both
countries are going to increase, it is important to emphasize that the precautionary savings motives of the
US increase by less than those of the RoW, such that the precautionary savings motive of the US relative to
the RoW actually goes down.
In our experiments we make two simplifying assumptions. One, rather than modeling the process of lib-
eralization as something that took place gradually over time, we make the simplifying assumption that it
11 As shown by Anagnostopoulos (2006) a global solution when there are relatively restrictive borrowing limits instead of a local approximation solution
avoids the well-known problem of non-stationarity of bonds in the model.
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Figure 3
Changes in capital controls and permissible region of bond holding
relaxation of RoW’s contraint tightening of RoW’s constraint





































































































































14 MNB WORKING PAPERS  2009/4THE MODEL
occurs at once. And two, the modeling of ﬁnancial markets, that is, the assumption that there only exists one
internationally traded bond, is clearly overly simplistic. In particular, it cannot address questions of portfo-
lio choice or give any rationale to why gross asset and liability positions have risen drastically, but focuses
entirely on the effect of capital liberalization on countries’ net positions. We however also see the simplicity
of our model and the fact that a standard model of consumption and saving choice is nested in our setup as
an advantage. We show that even in a simple setup and with only aggregate (country speciﬁc) risk we can
explain a sizable portion of the US net external deﬁcits through effects of capital liberalization.
MODEL SOLUTION
To address the questions we are interested in, local approximation techniques like loglinearization around
the non-stochastic steady state cannot be used. Instead, we need to use a global solution technique that
can explicitly account for the inﬂuence of second moments on agent’s policy functions and that also allows
treatment of occasionally binding inequality constraints.
We use time iteration techniques as described by Coleman (1990) and increased its speed by using the endoge-
nous grid points method developed by Carroll (2006) which reduces the number of non-linear equations the
algorithm needs to solve. Time iteration has several advantages as compared to standard dynamic program-
ming as it preserves the continuous nature of the state space since it relies on interpolation techniques, and it
easily allows to take into account inequality constraints. In particular, we make guesses on the policy rules
as functions of the economy’s state variables. In the endowment economy we obtain policy rules for bond















). Further details about the solution technique are provided in the appendix.
PARAMETERIZATION
Table 1 presents our baseline parameter values for the experiments of our model economy, chosen such as
to match US quarterly data versus the rest of the world. Most parameter choices are relatively standard
in the literature, which we brieﬂy outline ﬁrst. We then discuss the choice of the borrowing and lending
constraints, for which there is no previous (nor obvious) choice.
The coefﬁcient of risk aversion  is set to 2, a common choice in macroeconomics. The discount factor 
is set such as to match a 4% annual interest rate in the non-stochastic steady state. The exogenous process
follows a bivariate AR(1) with a coefﬁcient of autocorrelation  of 0.98 (and no spillovers). The standard
deviationoftheexogenousprocess" issetto0.0075,itscross-countrycorrelation" issetto0.4,asestimated
by Fogli and Perri (2006) for the US economy. We focus on a setup in which both economies are completely
symmetric, apart from the parameterization of the constraints reﬂecting the different degrees of ﬁnancial
openness. This way, the predictions of our model can be understood as stemming entirely from changes in
countries degree of ﬁnancial openness.
The parameter choice for the level of the constraints on capital in- and outﬂows is more challenging. Unfor-
tunately, there is no empirical counterpart that tells us what exactly the choice of these constraints should
be. We do not know how to relate regulatory measures such as the de jure indices presented in section 2 to
the quantitative measures we have in our model, where constraints are expressed as a fraction of NFA to a
country’soutput. Ontheotherhand, neithercanweuseactualobservedcapitalﬂowsas aguidelinein setting
the parameter of our constraints, as we would like to explain actual ﬂows as resulting from changes in the
constraints. We thus start with some initial parameters for the constraints, but perform extensive sensitivity
analysis on a) the level of initial constraints and b) the size of the relaxation of the constraints.
We set the initial (’before liberalization’) constraints for the home economy to 100 percent of its steady state
output (BBL = B
BL
= 1), reﬂecting the fact that the US economy was very little constrained already in
the 1980s. The initial constraints for the RoW are set such that the RoW is initially much less ﬁnancially
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Table 1
Baseline parameter values
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion  2
discount factor  0.9895
steady state level of output y, y
 1
persistence of exogenous processes  0.98
standard deviation of exogenous shock " 0.0075
shock correlation " 0.4




12 As argued in section 2, the initial constraint on capital outﬂows is likely to have been stricter, as many economies did not restrict capital from ﬂowing




. To clearly lay out the mechanism of how the presence of international liquidity constraints affect the model variables, we
instead focus on a setup of initially equal controls on capital inﬂows and outﬂows.
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BASELINE MODEL
This section outlines our main results. Before discussing the experiment of the relaxation in the home coun-
try’s borrowing constraint we comment on the general effect of borrowing constraints in a stochastic envi-
ronment. The presence of borrowing constraints give the agents of both countries an incentive to engage
in precautionary saving, to store away some extra assets in the ’good’ states of nature for the ’bad’ states in
which the constraint may bind and and in which they may not be able to borrow as much as they would
desire in world markets. In our endowment economy the only asset available to be used as a buffer is the
bond. Becauseinitialconstraintsaresuchthatthebothcountriescanborrowandlenduptothesameamount
(and the parameterization is symmetric otherwise), and because the bond must be held in zero net supply,
this means that none of two countries can actually have positive holdings of the international bond. As ﬁrst
observed by Aiyagari (1994), as a result of these motives to hold precautionary buffer assets, when the (gross)
real interest rate would be at their certainty equivalent level, 1
, there would be an excess demand for savings.
Under uncertainty, therefore, the asset price needs to be higher relative to its non-stochastic level to clear the
bond market, or, equivalently, the real interest rate needs to be lower than in a non-stochastic world.
We now turn to our experiments of how the process of capital liberalization affects the economic variables
of our model, and in particular, how it affects the US net foreign asset position. Rather than modeling
the process of liberalization as something that took place gradually over time, we make the simplifying
assumption that liberalization occurs at once. In particular, we model the catching up of the RoW in terms
of its ﬁnancial openness, that is, the dismantling of controls on its capital outﬂows as a one-time permanent
relaxation of B
BL
from 0.5 to B
AL
= 1. Because the US are initially more ﬁnancially open (such that
B
BL
< BBL), the relaxation of the RoW’s constraint on capital outﬂows translates also into a relaxation
of the US’ effective borrowing constraint from 50% of its current output level to 100% of its output. This
means that before capital liberalization the effective borrowing constraints are BBL = BBL = 0.5, but are
equal to BAL = 0.5 and BAL = 1.0 after liberalization. We choose the mid 1980 as the date for the experiment
which coincides with the start of the decline in the US net foreign asset position and the start of a major
liberalization period. With the relaxation of the US’ effective borrowing constraint the probability that the
constraint binds at any moment in time decreases. Both regions are now able to better smooth consumption
in response to shocks and to achieve a lower consumption volatility, and as a result, the motives to hold
precautionaryassetsinbothcountriesdecreases. ThedropintheUSconsumptiondemandforprecautionary
assets is larger, however, since home agents can now better insure against times when their consumption is
rather low.13 Accordingly, the US motive to hold precautionary assets decreases by more than the RoW’s
motive for buffer assets.
The left column of ﬁgure 4 shows the response of main macroeconomic variables in the face of the US’
increased ability to borrow in international markets in comparison to RoW. As a result of the fact that the
RoW’s desire for precautionary savings is now stronger relative to the US, we observe (in the ﬁrst and second
left panel of ﬁgure 4) a US current account deﬁcit and a gradual decline in the US net foreign asset position as
the economy transitions to a new steady state.14 At the end of 2006, our experiment implies US net foreign
liabilities to output of 4.3%, which means that our proposed channel could explain roughly one ﬁfth of the
empirically observed US external position. The decrease in the importance of US’ precautionary savings also
13 That is, with utility is concave, marginal utility of consumption is higher for low levels of consumption. Therefore agents beneﬁt more from being able to
smooth consumption through borrowing when their consumption is low than from lending when their consumption is high.
14 In principle the responses shown in ﬁgure 4 need to be derived from averages over a large number of simulations, such that the stochastic behavior
of the economy can be ’aggregated away’ and only the deterministic change in the policy functions -that reﬂects the change in the importance of
precautionary savings- is left over. To save computational time we instead feed " = 0 in the ‘simulation’ (the policy functions themselves have, of
course, been obtained from a stochastic setting with " as indicated in section 3).
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Figure 4
Response to a) a relaxation in the RoW’s constraint on capital outﬂows, and b) to a tightening in the RoW’s borrowing
constraint
relaxation of RoW’s contraint tightening of RoW’s constraint
on capital outﬂows on capital inﬂows
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lowers its demand for the asset and, as a consequence, pushes up the interest rate (panel 4 of ﬁgure 4) which
gives the RoW a motive to forgo consumption today. As interest rates increase the RoW ﬁnds it optimal
to save and enjoy higher consumption only in the future. The consumption responses in panel 3 of ﬁgure
4 show that home consumers implicitly become relatively more impatient. The drop in the precautionary
savingsmotiveleadsthemtoconsumemorerelativeearlyonattheexpenseofconsumptioninfutureperiods,
such that the long run value of US consumption at the new steady state is at a lower level permanently.
The right column of ﬁgure 4 shows the evolution of the model’s variables in response to the second exper-
iment we perform, a tightening of the RoW’s constraint on capital inﬂows. As outlined before, this can be
thought of as modeling the fact that many emerging countries in practice continue to have limitations in the
ability of obtaining external ﬁnance, and, after the recurrent crises that some of the emerging markets have
faced during the end of the 1990s, have suffered limitations in their ability to borrow internationally. We
observe that the responses of the current account, the net foreign asset position and consumption resemble,
at least qualitatively, the case of the ﬁrst experiment. This again is due to a shift in the relative importance
of precautionary assets across countries: in particular, it results in a higher precautionary savings motive in
the RoW relative to the US. The crucial difference is, however, that the tightening in the RoW’s effective
borrowing constraint has led to a lower ability to use the bond for consumption smoothing, which increases
demand for precautionary assets. As precautionary asset demand increase relatively more in the RoW, we
observe net ﬂows from the RoW to the US. The higher worldwide asset demand and as a result decreases the
interest rate.15
It is important to note that ﬁgure 4 does not plot the responses to a particular shock, nor did we assume that
the mean or variance of the endowment processes has changed at any point in time. The response in ﬁgure
4 is entirely due to the decrease in the importance of the precautionary savings motive for the US economy
as coming from the shift in international liquidity constraints, and plots the expected path as the economy
transitions to the new implied steady state.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO PARAMETER VALUES
Figure 5 presents some sensitivity analysis. Given the difﬁculty to parameterize the borrowing limits, we
consider it especially important to do sensitivity analysis on different values of the effective borrowing con-
straints. The quantitative response of net foreign assets to a relaxation depends on two things: one, on the
degree to which the constraints where initially restricting asset trade, and two, on the amount by which the
effective constraints are relaxed. The panels in the ﬁrst and second columns therefore show variations in the
assumptions on these constraints either before or after capital liberalization.
We plot the ﬁrst set of sensitivity experiments with respect to the borrowing constraints in column 1 of
ﬁgure 5 under varying degrees of ’initial ﬁnancial market openness’. We keep the size of the relaxation of the
home effective borrowing constraint constant at 0.5 (that is, BAL BBL = 0.5), and show the responses of the
economic variables for three different initial parameterizations. The ﬁrst set of responses repeat the baseline
case, thesecondassumesthatinitiallyinternationalﬁnancialmarketswereveryclosed(theconstraintschange
from BBL = BBL = 0.01 to BAL = 0.01 and BAL = 0.5)16, and the third starts out in a situation where
international ﬁnancial markets were (relatively) open to begin with (from BBL = BBL = 1.0 to BAL = 1.0
and BAL = 1.5). Since precautionary motives are highest when ﬁnancial markets can hardly be accessed as a
means to engage in consumption smoothing, the drop in the net foreign asset position is strongest in the case
where international ﬁnancial markets are initially very closed. In this case the implied NFA response at the
15 It is interesting to note, that within the framework of the model, the relaxation of the RoW’s outﬂow constraint (thought to have been taking place in
mainly the industrial countries and to only some degree in emerging economies) and the tightening of the RoW’s borrowing constraint (in emerging
economies) may also have interesting implication for the relation of ﬁnancial openness to consumption volatilities. In particular, it may give a rationale
to the empirical ﬁnding that industrial countries’ consumption volatilities typically have decreased with increasing ﬁnancial openness while emerging
countries’ consumption volatilities have increased.
16 For displaying the results of our sensitivity analysis we focus throughout on effective constraints, B and B.
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Figure 5
Sensitivity analysis for responses to a relaxation in the US effective borrowing constraint
level of initial ﬁnancial extent of Coefﬁcient of
market openness * liberalization ** risk aversion ***
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end of 2006 is -5.6% in comparison to -4.3% in the baseline case, while it is only -3.6% in the case of initially
rather open international ﬁnancial markets.
The second column of ﬁgure 5 shows different cases for ’the extent of liberalization’, that is, for different
assumptions on by how much the effective borrowing constraint is relaxed. We show the baseline case, and
the changes in the constraints from BBL = BBL = 0.5 to BAL = 0.5 and BAL = 1.5, and from BBL = BBL =
0.5 to BAL = 0.5 and BAL = 2.5. Not surprisingly, the decline in the net foreign asset position is more
pronounced the higher the extent of the relaxation, in which US net foreign assets in year 2006 stand at
-7.6% (in case 2) or -10.4% (in case 3) respectively.
Finally, the last column of ﬁgure 5 presents the equilibrium response of our baseline parameterization for
values of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion  equal to 1, 2 (baseline) and 5, respectively. As can be seen,
the higher is the degree of risk aversion, the smaller is the reduction of the importance of US’ precautionary
motives and therefore, the smaller is the accumulation of net foreign debt.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO THE FUNCTIONAL FORM OF
PREFERENCES
Carroll and Kimball (2006) distinguish between incentives for buffer asset holdings that derive from uncer-
taintyandthosethatderivefromliquidityconstraints-bothofwhichhavesimilareffectsbecausetheyleadto
a concave consumption function. Since our paper concentrates on the effects of buffer asset holdings that de-
rive from (changes in) liquidity constraint, we now turn to a further sensitivity experiment and use quadratic
instead of CRRA utility. Through the use of quadratic utility, which has no inherent precautionary savings
motive, we are able to isolate the role of precautionary savings motive as coming from international liquidity
constraints. Column 1 of ﬁgure 6 plots the equilibrium responses to our baseline experiment and contrasts
it with the case of quadratic utility. We ﬁnd that regardless of the assumption of preferences the equilibrium
responses are very similar.
COMPARISON WITH THE "GREAT MODERATION" EXPERIMENT
In order to compare the results obtained with our approach with the recent contribution of Fogli and Perri
(2006) we also run the experiment of the ’great moderation’ in US business cycle volatility. In their experi-
ment they consider a decrease in the volatility of US aggregate productivity of one third. Column 2 of ﬁgure
6 plots the results of the ’great moderation’ experiment.17 We ﬁnd that both capital liberalization in the RoW
and the great moderation of business cycle volatility can contribute to explaining the US net foreign asset
position. At the end of 2006, the process of capital has led to a net foreign asset position of -4.3% of output,
while the great moderation can contribute to explaining another 3.2%.
A MODEL WITH PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
It can be argued that in a setup in which agents’ only option to save and to smooth consumption intertempo-
rally is through the use of the international bond, that the effects of changes in the strength of precautionary
savings motives across countries have an unrealistically strong impact on the external position. We there-
fore now turn to a model setup in which the representative agents in both countries are also owners of the
economy’s capital stock which is used in production. This gives the agents another asset that can be used to
smooth intertemporal consumption and to hold savings for precautionary reasons. Now, the home repre-
sentative agent maximizes eq. (1) with respect to borrowing constraint (4) and lending limit (5). As in the
endowment economy, international asset markets can therefore be used only incompletely for consumption
17 Note that the model used by Fogli and Perri (2006) is different as they include capital accumulation in their model. We also include an additional asset
in the next section.
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Figure 6
Further experiments on the baseline model
CRRA vs. Quadratic Capital Liberalization
Utility * vs. Great Moderation **


























































































































































































































* sensitivity analysis for assumption of preferences: CRRA utility vs. quadratic utility.
** comparison of capital liberalization with great moderation experiment.
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smoothing purposes. The budget constraint under this set-up and the law of motion for capital are:
ct + xt +
bt+1
rt
= !tn + r k
t kt + bt (14)








where kt is capital, n is labor, which is supplied inelastically, and wt and r k
t refer to the wage rate and the
return of capital respectively. To avoid a counterfactual volatile investment, xt, there are adjustment costs to
install new capital. Households are assumed to supply their labor inelastically.
Firms produce output according to a Cobb-Douglas production function and face a country speciﬁc produc-
tivity. They are assumed to be competitive such that proﬁt maximization leads to factors being paid their
marginal products.






















where z is a parameter reﬂecting the mean productivity, A is a 2x2 matrix of coefﬁcients describing the





is a vector of shocks from a bivariate normal
distribution with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix V(e), i.e. et  N (0,V (e)).
The equilibrium of this economy is deﬁned as a path of interest rates frtg1



























t=0 such that households and ﬁrms solve their optimization prob-
lem and markets for bonds, consumption and capital clear.
Theequilibriumconditionsofthefullmodelaregivenbythesetofequilibriumconditionsoftheendowment
model, equations (6)-(13) -where the budget constraints are replaced by their versions of equation (14) - plus
the additional Euler equations with respect to the choice of the optimal capital stock, given by equation 17










































Solution method and parameters values
The model is solved with the same technique as in the endowment economy model. In the full model with
















the model with capital we have a number of additional parameters. The capital share  is set equal to 0.36.
The quarterly depreciation rate, , is set to 2.5%. In order to avoid counterfactual volatile investment, we
include quadratic capital adjustment costs with parameter equal to 8. The AR(1) process for our exogenous
variables is unchanged, with the only difference that the interpretation of these variables is now technology
not output endowments.
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Figure 7
Response to an relaxation of controls on capital outﬂows in the RoW
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Responses to capital liberalization in the full model with capital
Figure 7 presents the equilibrium responses when the RoW is initially facing a high level of capital controls.





= 1. After capital liberalization takes place in the RoW, the foreign lending constraint softens
which also relaxes the US’ effective borrowing constraint. As in the endowment model, we can observe that
the US net foreign asset position before the onset of capital liberalization in the rest of the world is initially
zero, and then starts its subsequent decline. As ﬁgure 7 shows, the drop in the US net foreign asset position
remains substantial in the capital model, despite the fact that part of the decrease of buffer stock holdings
that result from lower precautionary motives of the US is expressed by lowering investment, and therefore,
by a decrease in the economy’s long-run capital stock level. While the drop in home variables (investment,
capital stock) are relatively small quantitatively, the effects on the external position are quite substantial -a
model prediction that is in line with the experience of the US economy.
18 This is the same assumption we made for the endowment model, just that the exogenous processes describe productivity instead of output.
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Since the mid 1980’s we have observed a persistent decline in the US net foreign asset position and continues
to be the main world net borrower. Not only is the size and persistence of the US NFA position puzzling, it
is contrary to the conventional wisdom of neoclassical theory, which predicts that capital would ﬂow from
rich to poor countries. Among the most notable changes in the world between the mid 1980s and today is
the rapid process of dismantling of controls on international capital ﬂows. In this paper we have explored the
role of the process of capital liberalization in driving the US net foreign asset position into deﬁcit. For doing
so, we used a stylized model of consumption and savings choice across countries, enriched with borrowing
and lending constraints that proxy for the presence of controls on capital in- and outﬂows. In an extension
we also considered a model with capital accumulation, which is very close to the two-country one model
good of Backus et al. (1992), a workhorse model in international macroeconomics.
In all cases, we have shown that the current US net external imbalance can be a natural outcome of the
catching up process of other advanced and emerging economies in terms of their ﬁnancial openness in the
last 25 years.
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A Appendix
The endowment model of section 3 as well as the model with capital accumulation of section 4 are solved
by making policy function guesses combined with the method of endogenous grid points. Below we brieﬂy
outline the steps of the algorithm used:
 We follow the methodology of Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to discretize the exogenous processes. In
the following, we denote t+1 variables with a prime, that is, b0 is bt+1 (and accordingly, b00 is bt+2). We
construct a grid of endogenous state variables at time t +1. For the endowment economy we therefore
have, for each combination of y0 and y0, a one-dimensional grid in b0 which consists of nb grid points
and ranges from min( By,By) to max(By, By). For the capital economy we construct, for each
combination of z0 and z0, a 3-dimensional grid in k0,k0,b0 consisting of nknknb grid points. The
range for k0 and k0 is set from .6 to 1.4 times the non-stochastic steady state level of the capital stock.
The number of gridpoints waschosentobe nb = 25 and ny = ny = 15. Forthefull model withcapital,
we used nb = 21, nk = nk = 13 and nz = nz = 5.
 Set counter equal to 1. We make initial policy function guesses using the log-linear solution as starting
point. In the endowment economy guesses are made for b00(b0;y0,y0) and r0(b0;y0,y0). In the capital
economy initial guesses are made for b00(k0,k0,b0;z0,z0), k00(k0,k0,b0;z0,z0), k00(k0,k0,b0;z0,z0),
and r0(k0,k0,b0;z0,z0).
 Using these initial policy function guesses, and using the discretized states and transition matrix for
the exogenous processes, the conditional expectations in the Euler Equations can be computed. In par-






from equations (6)-(7). For the





and its foreign counterpart
from equation (17).
 Using the so computed expressions for the conditional expectations, the values of b (or, respectively,
the values of k,k and b) are found for each grid-point b0 (combination of grid-points k0,k0 and b0)
by using a nonlinear equations solver.
 Finally,thepolicyfunctionguessesareupdatedusinginterpolationmethods. Asthefunction b0(b;y,y)
and r(b;y,y)(or, inthecapitaleconomy, k0(k,k,b;z,z), b0(k,k,b;z,z) and r(k,k,b;z,z))are
known, one can obtain the updated guesses by interpolating b00 and r0 at points (b0;y0,y0) (or, in the
capital economy, k00,k00,b00 and r0 at points (k0,k0,b0;z0,z0)).
 The above steps are repeated until convergence is achieved.
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